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Abstract
A design is given for an optimized entangling probe attacking the
BB84 (Bennett-Brassard 1984) protocol of quantum key distribution and
yielding maximum information to the probe for a full range of induced
error rates. Probe photon polarization states become optimally entangled
with the signal states on their way between the legitimate transmitter
and receiver. Although standard von-Neumann projective measurements
of the probe yield maximum information on the pre-privacy amplified key,
if instead the probe measurements are performed with a certain positive
operator valued measure, then the measurement results are conclusive, at
least some of the time, for a full range of inconclusive rates.
Keywords: quantum cryptography, quantum key distribution, quan-
tum communication, entanglement.
PACS: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ta
1 INTRODUCTION
Recently, a design was presented [1], [2] for an optimized entangling probe at-
tacking the BB84 Protocol [3] of quantum key distribution (QKD) and yielding
maximum information to the probe. Probe photon polarization states become
optimally entangled with the signal states on their way between the legitimate
transmitter and receiver. Although standard von-Neumann projective measure-
ments of the probe yield maximum information on the pre-privacy amplified
key, it was shown that if instead the probe measurements are performed with
a certain positive operator valued measure (POVM) [4], [5], [6] [7], [8] then the
measurement results are conclusive, at least some of the time [9]. If the incon-
clusive rate equals the loss rate of the legitimate receiver (due to attenuation
in the key distribution channel), and only the unambiguous states are relayed
by the probe to the legitimate receiver, then the probe can obtain complete
information on the pre-privacy amplified key, once the bases are announced on
the public channel during reconciliation. The implementation in [1], [2] applied
for error rates less than 1/4, thereby allowing inconclusive rates of the POVM
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receiver exceeding 1/3. In the present work, an alternative probe design is pre-
sented for which the error rate is less than 1/3. This enables an inconclusive
rate of the POVM receiver ranging from 0 to 1, matching possible loss rates
between the probe and the legitimate receiver.
In Section 2, the alternative optimized unitary transformation is reviewed,
representing the action of an optimized entangling probe yielding maximum
information on quantum key distribution in the BB84 protocol. In Section 3,
the design is given of the entangling probe for a full range of induced error rates.
In Section 4, analysis is presented for alternatively using the POVM receiver of
[4] to measure the probe, thereby unambiguously discriminating the signal, at
least some of the time. Section 5 contains a summary.
2 ALTERNATIVE ENTANGLING PROBE
In the present work, I present an implementation of the optimum unitary trans-
formation given by Eqs.(158)-(164) of [1], however with restricted parameters
such that the corresponding Hilbert space of the probe reduces from four to two
dimensions. In particular, the parameters µ and θ are here restricted to
sinµ = cosµ = 2−1/2, cos θ = 1. (1)
In this case, the entangling probe states |σ+〉, |σ−〉, |σ〉, |δ+〉, |δ−〉, |δ〉, given
by Eqs. (159)-(164) of [1], become
|σ+〉 = |δ−〉 = 4[(1− 2E)
1/2 |wa〉 − E
1/2 |wb〉], (2)
|σ−〉 = |δ+〉 = 4[(1− 2E)
1/2 |wa〉+ E
1/2 |wb〉], (3)
|σ〉 = − |δ〉 = 4E1/2 |wb〉 , (4)
in which I have made the upper sign choices in Eqs.(159)-(164) of [1], E is the
error rate induced by the probe, and the orthonormal probe basis vectors |wa〉
and |wb〉 are defined by
|wa〉 = 2
−1/2 (|w0〉+ |w3〉) , (5)
|wb〉 = 2
−1/2 (|w1〉 − |w2〉) , (6)
expressed in terms of the orthonormal basis vectors |w0〉, |w3〉, |w1〉, and |w2〉
of [1]. Thus, the optimum unitary transformation, Eq.(158) of [1], produces in
this case the following entanglements for initial probe state |w〉 and incoming
BB84 signal photon-polarization states |u〉, |u〉, |v〉, or |v〉, respectively:
|u〉 ⊗ |w〉 −→
1
4
(|u〉 ⊗ |σ+〉+ |u〉 ⊗ |σ〉) , (7)
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|u〉 ⊗ |w〉 −→
1
4
(|u〉 ⊗ |σ〉+ |u〉 ⊗ |σ−〉) , (8)
|v〉 ⊗ |w〉 −→
1
4
(|v〉 ⊗ |σ−〉 − |v〉 ⊗ |σ〉) , (9)
|v〉 ⊗ |w〉 −→
1
4
(− |v〉 ⊗ |σ〉+ |v〉 ⊗ |σ+〉) . (10)
Here, the probe states |σ+〉, |σ−〉, |σ〉 are given by Eqs.(2)-(4). The states |u〉
and |u〉 are orthogonal linearly-polarized photon signal states in the {|u〉 , |u〉}
basis, and |v〉 and |v〉 are orthogonal linearly-polarized photon signal states in
the {|v〉 , |v〉} basis, and the two bases are nonorthogonal with pi/4 angle between
the linear polarizations of states |u〉 and |v〉. In the present case, the maximum
information gain by the probe is again given by
IRopt = log2
[
2−
(
1− 3E
1− E
)2]
, (11)
and here E ≤ 1/3, since E = 1/3 corresponds to perfect information.
3 DESIGN OF ENTANGLING PROBE
Using the same methods presented in [1], it can be shown that a quantum cir-
cuit consisting again of a single CNOT gate suffices to produce the optimum
entanglement, Eqs.(7)-(10). Here, the control qubit entering the control port
of the CNOT gate consists of the two signal basis states {|e0〉 , |e1〉}. In the
two-dimensional Hilbert space of the signal, the basis states |e0〉 and |e1〉, re-
spectively, are orthogonal and make equal angles of pi/8 with the nonorthogonal
signal states |u〉 and |v〉, respectively. The target qubit entering the target port
of the CNOT gate consists of the two orthonormal linearly-polarized photon
polarization basis states |wa〉 and |wb〉 of the probe. When |e0〉 enters the con-
trol port, {|wa〉 , |wb〉} becomes {|wb〉 , |wa〉}, and when |e1〉 enters the control
port, {|wa〉 , |wb〉} remains the same. The initial unnormalized target state of
the probe can, in this case, be shown to be given by (See Fig. 3 of [1]):
|A2〉 = (1− 2E)
1/2 |wa〉+ (2E)
1/2 |wb〉 , (12)
and the unnormalized transition state is given by
|A1〉 = (1− 2E)
1/2 |wa〉 − (2E)
1/2 |wb〉 . (13)
Next, by arguments directly paralleling those of [1], using Eqs.(7)-(10), one has
the following correlations between the signal states and the projected probe
states, |σ+〉 and |σ−〉:
|u〉 ⇐⇒ |σ+〉 , |u〉 ⇐⇒ |σ−〉 , (14)
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and
|v〉 ⇐⇒ |σ−〉 , |v〉 ⇐⇒ |σ+〉 . (15)
The measurement basis for the symmetric von Neumann projective mea-
surement of the probe must be orthogonal and symmetric about the correlated
probe states, |σ+〉 and |σ−〉, in the two-dimensional Hilbert space of the probe
[1]. Thus, consistent with Eqs.(2) and (3), I define the following orthonormal
measurement basis states:
|w+〉 = 2
−1/2(|wa〉+ |wb〉), (16)
|w−〉 = 2
−1/2(|wa〉 − |wb〉). (17)
Next, one notes that the correlations of the projected probe states |σ+〉 and
|σ−〉 with the measurement basis states |w+〉 and |w−〉 are indicated, according
to Eqs.(2), (3), (16), and (17), by the following probabilities:
|〈w+|σ+〉|
2
|σ+|
2
=
|〈w−|σ−〉|
2
|σ−|
2
=
1
2
−
E1/2(1− 2E)1/2
(1− E)
, (18)
|〈w+|σ−〉|
2
|σ−|
2
=
|〈w−|σ+〉|
2
|σ+|
2
=
1
2
+
E1/2(1− 2E)1/2
(1− E)
, (19)
consistent with Eqs.(198) and (199) of [1], and implying the following dominant
state correlations:
|σ+〉 ⇐⇒ |w−〉 , |σ−〉 ⇐⇒ |w+〉 . (20)
Next combining the correlations (14), (15), and (20), one thus establishes the
following correlations:
{|u〉 , |v〉} ⇐⇒ |σ+〉 ⇐⇒ |w−〉 , (21)
{|u〉 , |v〉} ⇐⇒ |σ−〉 ⇐⇒ |w+〉 , (22)
to be implemented by the projective measurement of the probe, as in [1].
One therefore arrives at the following alternative entangling probe design.
An incident photon coming from the legitimate transmitter is received by the
probe in one of the four signal-photon linear-polarization states |u〉, |u〉, |v〉,
or |v〉 in the BB84 protocol. The signal photon enters the control port of a
CNOT gate. The initial state of the probe is a photon in linear-polarization
state |A2〉 entering the target port of the CNOT gate. The probe photon is
produced by a single-photon source and is appropriately timed with reception
of the signal photon by first sampling a few successive signal pulses to determine
the repetition rate of the transmitter. The photon linear-polarization state |A2〉,
according to Eq.(12), is given by
|A2〉 = (1− 2E)
1/2 |wa〉+ (2E)
1/2 |wb〉 , (23)
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and can be simply set for an error rate E by means of a polarizer. In this way
the entangling probe can be tuned to the chosen error rate to be induced by the
probe. The outgoing gated signal photon is relayed on to the legitimate receiver,
and the gated probe photon enters a Wollaston prism, oriented to separate pho-
ton orthogonal-linear-polarization states |w+〉 and |w−〉, and the photon is then
detected by one of two photodetectors. This is an ordinary von Neumann pro-
jective measurement. If the basis, revealed during the public basis-reconciliation
phase of the BB84 protocol, is {|u〉, |u〉}, then the photodetector located to re-
ceive the polarization state |w−〉 or |w+〉, respectively, will indicate, in accord
with the correlations (21) and (22), that a state |u〉 or |u〉, respectively, was
most likely measured by the legitimate receiver. Alternatively, if the announced
basis is {|v〉, |v〉}, then the photodetector located to receive the polarization
state |w+〉 or |w−〉, respectively, will indicate, in accord with the correlations
(21) and (22), that a state |v〉 or |v〉, respectively, was most likely measured by
the legitimate receiver. By comparing the record of probe photodetector trig-
gering with the sequence of bases revealed during reconciliation, then the likely
sequence of ones and zeroes constituting the key, prior to privacy amplification,
can be assigned. In any case the net effect is to yield, for a set error rate E, the
maximum information gain to the probe, which is given by Eq.(11).
4 POVM MEASUREMENTOF ENTANGLING
PROBE
Instead of performing a von-Neumann projective measurement of the entangling
probe (using the Wollaston prism along with two photodetectors, as in the
above), one can conclusively detect the two nonorthogonal probe states |σ+〉
and |σ−〉, at least some of the time. For this purpose, the POVM receiver
(See Fig.1 of [4]) must simply be set up to distinguish the nonorthogonal states
|σ+〉 / |σ+| and |σ−〉 / |σ−| (instead of the states |u〉 and |v〉 described in [4]).
For this purpose, the Wollaston prism in Fig.1 of [4] must be aligned to separate
the nonorthogonal states:
∣∣∣ˆeσ++σ−〉 ≡
|σ+〉
|σ+|
+ |σ−〉|σ
−
|[(
〈σ+|
|α+|
+ 〈σ−||σ
−
|
)(
|σ+〉
|σ+|
+ |σ−〉|σ
−
|
)]1/2 (24)
and ∣∣∣ˆeσ+−σ−〉 ≡
|σ+〉
|σ+|
− |σ−〉|σ
−
|[(
〈σ+|
|α+|
− 〈σ−||σ
−
|
)(
|σ+〉
|σ+|
− |σ−〉|σ
−
|
)]1/2 (25)
(instead of
∣∣∣ˆeu+v〉 and ∣∣∣ˆeu−v〉, as in [4]). The inconclusive rate R? (or, equiv-
alently, P? in the notation of [4]) of the POVM receiver is given by [4], [9]
R? =
〈σ+|σ−〉
|σ+| |σ−|
. (26)
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Next, using Eqs.(2) and (3) in Eq.(26) and solving for E, one obtains
E =
1−R?
3−R?
. (27)
For this case of measurement of the probe with the POVM receiver, according to
Eq.(27), E can be treated as a parameter ranging from 0 to 1/3 and determined
by a set inconclusive rate R?. The conclusive rate Rc is given by
Rc = 1− R? . (28)
The overlap Q between the states |σ+〉 and |σ−〉 is given by
Q =
〈σ+|σ−〉
|σ+| |σ−|
, (29)
or using Eqs.(26), one obtains
Q = R?. (30)
Also, substituting Eq.(27) in Eq.(23), one obtains
|A2〉 = (1 +R?)
1/2 |wa〉+ 2
1/2(1 −R?)
1/2 |wb〉 , (31)
in which, since |A2〉 is not normalized, an overall factor of (3−R?)
−1/2, appearing
in both |A2〉 and |A1〉, is dropped. Analogously , one obtains
|A1〉 = (1 +R?)
1/2 |wa〉 − 2
1/2(1 −R?)
1/2 |wb〉 . (32)
According to Eq.(31), the initial state |A2〉 of the probe can be tuned to a set
inconclusive rate of the POVM receiver. The reflection coefficient R1 of the
beamsplitter BS1 in the POVM-receiver in Fig. 1 of [4] must, for the case at
hand, be given by
R1 = tan
2
(
1
2
cos−1Q
)
=
1−Q
1 +Q
, (33)
or substituting Eq.(30) in Eq.(33), one obtains
R1 =
1−R?
1 +R?
. (34)
Thus the reflection coefficient R1 must be set, according to Eq.(34), by the set
inconclusive rate. This will require a beamsplitter with an adjustable reflection
coefficient.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that, if the photon loss rate, due to
attenuation in the key distribution channel between the probe and the legiti-
mate receiver, equals the inconclusive rate R?, and only the conclusive states
are relayed by the probe to the legitimate receiver, then the entangling probe
together with the POVM receiver can obtain complete information on the pre-
privacy-amplified key, once the polarization bases are announced in the public
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channel during reconciliation [9]. Also, to counter alteration in the attenuation
due to the probe, the legitimate channel may be replaced by a more transparent
one [10]. One may therefore conclude that the BB84 protocol has a vulnerability
very similar to the well-known vulnerability of the B92 (Bennett 1992) protocol
[9], [10]. It is also important to emphasize that, because for the present imple-
mentation one has 0 ≤ E ≤ 1/3, the inconclusive rate, according to Eq.(27),
can range here from 0 to 1, and can match a corresponding loss rate in the
channel connecting the probe to the legitimate receiver. If the inconclusive rate
R? is chosen to match the loss rate in the channel connecting to the legitimate
receiver, then the initial state of the probe must be tuned (using a polarizer
located between the single-photon source and the target entrance port of the
CNOT gate) to the value given by Eq.(31).
5 CONCLUSION
The design is determined for an optimized quantum cryptographic entangling
probe attacking the BB84 protocol of QKD and yielding maximum information
to the probe for a full range of induced error rates. Also, it is demonstrated
that if the projective measurement of the probe is replaced by a POVM receiver,
the measurements are conclusive, at least some of the time, for a full range of
inconclusive rates.
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